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The Strategic Role of Reinsurance in the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
Non-Life Insurance Market 
 
Abstract 
Using panel data for five main lines of insurance in the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) non-life insurance market we demonstrate that by increasing the level 
of reinsurance, primary insurers increase their product-market share at the 
expense of less reinsured rivals. We also observe that the influence of 
reinsurance and other financial variables on insurers’ growth in product-
market share differs across lines of insurance business. We conclude that 
reinsurance performs an important strategic function in insurance markets 
through its impact on product-market outcomes in competitive insurance 
markets. Additionally, we find that leverage is the most important factor 
affecting product-market share at the aggregate business level of the 
insurance firm.  
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I. Introduction  
Recent studies reported in the finance literature demonstrate that 
corporate hedging decisions affect the strategic performance of firms and 
as a result, product-market considerations are an integral part of the 
corporate risk management process (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Adam, Dasgupta and Titman, 2007). In the 
spirit of this stream of research, the present study examines the strategic 
role of reinsurance in influencing annual changes in product-market share 
in five main segments of the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-life (property-
liability) insurance market – motor vehicle, property, legal liability, personal 
accident, and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss.  
Reinsurance is a conditional financial claims contract written by a third 
party (the reinsurer) that indemnifies the counterparty (the primary 
insurer) for random loss events in return for a share of annual premiums 
written (Doherty and Tinic, 1981)1. Doherty and Tinic (1981) report that 
reinsurance enables primary insurers to more effectively manage cash flow 
                                                 
1 Winton (1995) points out that there are two main risk-sharing treaties between a reinsurer and 
insurer: proportional (e.g., quota share) treaties where losses are shared between the parties on an 
agreed percentage basis; and non-proportional (e.g., excess-of-loss) treaties where the reinsurance 
company absorbs all losses over an amount that is retained by the insurer subject to an upper limit. 
Adiel (1996) also notes that in insurance markets, reinsurance can also include financial (or finite) 
reinsurance that commonly provide an up-front capital injection or relief to reserves (surplus) linked 
to the net present value (NPV) of liabilities with the level of ceded premiums linked to the value of 
future claims and profit emergence. However, data on different risk-sharing reinsurance treaties and 
financial reinsurance arrangements were not publicly available for the full period of our analysis 
(1987-2010). 
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volatility, maintain future underwriting capacity, and reduce the probability 
of ruin. The strategic finance function of reinsurance is important not only 
because solvency risk matters to policyholders and insurance industry 
regulators, but also because of market imperfections (e.g., frictional costs 
and taxes) retaining capital can be costly for funding providers (Harrington 
and Niehaus, 2003). Froot and O’Connell (2008) also contend that 
managers of insurance firms are particularly likely to reinsure non-
standardized and difficult-to-assess risk exposures (that often typify lines 
of non-life insurance such as legal liability). This risk-transfer/risk-sharing 
capability enables primary insurers to economize on the costs of financing 
positive NPV investments, protect cash holdings, reduce premiums (prices), 
and increase their market power. Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000) 
further observe that reinsurers possess proprietary advantages (e.g., 
superior information on emergent risks) that primary insurers can share (at 
cost) in order to more accurately price assumed risks and thereby secure 
competitive advantages over rivals. 
Fresard (2010) argues that when external finance is costly, capital and 
liquidity management decisions can play important roles in influencing 
competitive outcomes for firms. Zou and Adams (2008) add that risk 
management decisions (such as (re)insurance) can be influenced by size-
related factors such as the ability of firms to efficiently diversify and retain 
risks. The present study thus examines the extent to which reinsurance (as 
a common indemnity risk management contract in insurance markets) 
influences the product-market position of insurance firms while 
simultaneously controlling for other potentially important intervening firm-
specific factors such as leverage, liquidity, and size. Our research is 
motivated in four key regards. First, insurance product-markets are 
becoming more price competitive in developed economies such as the 
United States (US) and UK, particularly in the wake of the recent global 
economic crisis (Doherty and Lamm-Tennant, 2009; A. M. Best, 2012). This 
has heightened the importance for empirical research on how reinsurance 
can be used to secure strategic competitive advantages - for example, by 
allowing insurers to reduce prices but at the same time maintain solvency 
and sufficient holdings of cash (liquidity) for investing in positive NPV 
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projects. Second, indemnity contracts, such as reinsurance, are pure hedge 
instruments that cannot be used for speculation (Doherty, 2000; Aunon-
Nerin and Ehling, 2008). This means that by acting as a pure hedge against 
claims volatility, reinsurance enables primary insurers to more effectively 
plan and price new products and to ensure sufficient risk capacity for such 
new lines of business. Therefore, risk financing impacts on primary insurers’ 
marketing strategies and the micro-structure of insurance markets, which 
in turn directly influences the product-market share of insurance firms. 
Such perspectives are likely to be of commercial, regulatory and policy 
interest. Third, our single country/single industry focus 'naturally’ controls 
for biases (e.g., due to differences in risk management practices and 
product-market structure) that can arise in cross-industry and/or 
transnational research. At the same time, the results of the present study 
could be generalized to other industrial sectors (e.g., banking) that also 
use hedging tools to grow their business and maximize the value of the 
firm. Fourth, our study provides insights on the product-market linkages 
between reinsurance, and capital and liquidity management decisions in 
insurance firms. For example, Zanjani (2002) argues that the ability of 
insurers to differentiate product prices, and so influence their competitive 
position in markets, can be related to their marginal costs of capital, 
liquidity position, and ability to transfer assumed (extreme) risks through 
the purchase of reinsurance. However, this strategic dimension of 
reinsurance has neither been given sufficient emphasis nor fully 
investigated in previous empirical studies of insurance markets. In this 
respect, our research adds to the extant literature on the impact of capital, 
liquidity and risk management on the product-market position of firms and 
the shaping of market structure.  
In summary, our results indicate that increasing the level of 
reinsurance allows primary insurers to grow their product-market share at 
the expense of less reinsured rivals. We also observe that the influence of 
reinsurance and other financial variables on insurers’ growth in product-
market share varies between lines of insurance business. Additionally, 
financial leverage is an important factor affecting product-market share at 
the aggregate business level of the insurance firm. 
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The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section II provides 
institutional background information on the UK’s non-life insurance market. 
In Section III we review the relevant strategic finance literature and 
develop our primary research hypothesis. Section IV describes our research 
design, including an outline of the modelling procedure employed, definition 
of the variables used, and a description of the data. Section V analyses and 
discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. Institutional Background 
The UK’s non-life insurance market comprises about 360 or so locally 
licensed and active domestically-owned and foreign-owned companies, 
subsidiaries and branches of varying size, ownership structure, and 
product-mix2. The market currently generates approximately £47 billion 
(US$76 billion) in net (of reinsurance) annual premiums (Association of 
British Insurers, 2011) 3 . In addition, 87 Lloyd’s syndicates currently 
underwrite non-life premiums of roughly £24 billion (US$39 billion) mainly 
in marine, aviation and transport (MAT) lines of insurance (A.M. Best, 
2012). By this standard, the UK is the largest insurance market in Europe 
and the third largest in the world after the US and Japan (Shiu, 2011). The 
annual value of non-life reinsurance premiums in the UK (including Lloyd’s) 
is about £23 billion (US$37billion) with approximately 70% of annual 
market reinsurance premiums transacted with global reinsurance 
corporations such as Munich Re and Swiss Re (Data Monitor, 2011). The 
UK’s non-life insurance and reinsurance markets are relatively unregulated 
with regard to the quantum of losses that can be covered, indemnity terms, 
type of contract permitted, and so on (Shiu, 2011). In many ways, 
reinsurers operating in the UK are regulated on much the same basis as 
                                                 
2 Additionally, 548 non-life insurers licensed by European Economic Area (EEA) member states are 
permitted to conduct business in the UK under the 1992 Third European Insurance Directive 
(Financial Services Authority, 2013). However, these non-life insurance firms are not regulated by 
the UK insurance industry regulator and so they are outside the scope of this study.  
 
3 Approximately 150 or so inactive (and mainly small) non-life insurance funds were also authorized 
to operate in the UK as at the end of 2010. Furthermore, about 600 EU-based insurance carriers are 
currently permitted to transact insurance business in the UK under various promulgations of the EU’s 
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive. In addition, the relative proportion of total annual premiums 
currently written (plus the approximate number of firms) in the five main lines of business examined 
in the present study are: motor vehicle – 37% (n~50); property – 30% (n~70); legal liability – 
11%; (n~60); personal accident – 14% (n~45); and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss – 8% 
(n~60)(Association of British Insurers, 2011). 
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primary insurers (Abdul Kader, Adams and Mouratidis, 2010). For example, 
insurance and reinsurance companies operating in the UK have to be 
approved and licensed by the insurance industry regulator4. The regulator 
is, amongst other things, responsible for monitoring and reviewing the 
capital adequacy (including reinsurance arrangements) of insurance and 
reinsurance companies doing business in the UK. Since 2007, UK-based 
reinsurers are also subject to the European Union’s (EU’s) Reinsurance 
Directive which aims, amongst other things, to ensure consistency in 
reinsurers’ reserving practices, standards of capital maintenance, and 
solvency reporting (Abdul Kader et al., 2010). 
The UK’s non-life reinsurance market is a potentially interesting 
environment within which to conduct this research project for three main 
reasons. First, as in other developed insurance markets such as the US, 
reinsurance is becoming an increasingly important capital and risk 
management device in the UK as a greater range of potentially high value 
and difficult to predict risk exposures emerge (Froot, 2001). Reinsurance is 
also likely to become a particularly salient strategic issue for UK insurers 
following the implementation of the European Union’s (EU) new risk capital 
(Solvency II) requirements on 1 January 2016 (Abdul Kader et al., 2010). 
Second, property-casualty lines of insurance in the UK tend to be supplied 
by a small number of composite insurers (e.g., Aviva and Royal Sun 
Alliance) (A.M. Best, 2011). However, EU-induced deregulation since the 
1990s, business opportunities at the Lloyd's of London insurance market, 
and extensive and varied distribution networks have increased price and 
product-market competition in the domestic market, particularly in 
personal lines and motor insurance. These developments have combined to 
make the UK the most competitive insurance market in the EU (Hardwick 
and Dou, 2006). Thus our study provides evidence on the strategic 
dimension of the reinsurance–market share relation in competitive 
                                                 
 
4 During the period of our analysis (1987- 2010) UK insurance companies were regulated first by 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and from 2001 by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA). From 1 April 2013, the statutory supervision and regulation of UK insurance companies has 
been conducted by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) while insurance market practices and 
consumer issues have been regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Both regulatory 
bodies are subsidiaries of the Bank of England. 
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insurance environments. Third, unlike in the US where many State-based 
insurance regulators impose higher capital maintenance requirements on 
foreign (so-called ‘alien’) reinsurance companies than US-owned reinsurers 
(Weiss and Chung, 2004); UK regulations do not discriminate between 
reinsurance companies according to their domicile of origin. Again unlike 
the US, the UK is also a unitary fiscal environment and does not impose 
regulatory limits on premiums as do some states in the US (e.g., New York). 
These institutional differences are important as reinsurance, taxes, and 
premium rates directly influence underwriting capacity and product-market 
strategies. Therefore, compared with the US, the purchase of reinsurance 
and product-market decisions of UK insurers is less likely to be affected by 
regulation-induced market disequilibria such as constrained supply and 
price distortions. These institutional features thus enable us to conduct a 
potentially more robust test of the linkage between reinsurance and the 
strategic objectives of primary insurers, and so build on the extant 
literature. 
 
III. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section we review the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature linking the financial and risk management of firms with their 
competitive position in the product-markets that they operate. We then put 
forward the main research hypothesis that directs our empirical tests. 
Towards a Strategic Theory of Reinsurance 
The trading of insurance risks in secondary reinsurance markets 
enables the managers of insurance firms to realize important strategic 
objectives such as meeting statutory minimum levels of solvency, 
increasing underwriting capacity, and increasing firm value (e.g., by 
reducing future taxes and agency costs) (Mayers and Smith, 1990). These 
financial and risk management attributes of reinsurance can have a direct 
impact on the product-market share of insurance firms – for example, by 
helping them provide enhanced surety to policyholders, brokers and 
regulators and so attract more new business and increase product-market 
share (Doherty and Tinic, 1981). The product-market position of primary 
insurers can be further enhanced by reinsurers as a result of their provision 
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for ancillary business advice and the effective monitoring of reinsurance 
arrangements. These attributes can help insurers to increase outputs, 
reduce prices and so grow product-market share and increase their market 
value. These aspects of the strategic marketing function of reinsurance in 
insurance markets and their link with other financial management aspects 
of corporate strategy are examined further below. 
Market Imperfections and Strategic Behavior 
Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) demonstrate that in the presence 
of agency costs and information asymmetries, capital structure and 
associated risk hedging decisions have a favorable effect on the cost of 
borrowing and investment restrictions. This enables them to make 
competitive gains at the expense of rivals by reducing costs (e.g., lower 
debt expenses) and/or increasing revenues (e.g., from new positive NPV 
projects).  
Brander and Lewis (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), and Opler 
and Titman (1994), amongst others, note that in competitive 
environments, such as the UK’s insurance market5, highly levered firms are 
frequently at risk of predation from lowly levered firms as the former are 
often more cash constrained than the latter6. This situation limits the ability 
of cash constrained firms to optimize their investment opportunity sets and 
compete effectively in product-markets. In other words, predation risk 
arises when financially superior (low levered and/or cash unconstrained) 
firms operating in competitive markets influence the product-market (e.g., 
pricing and entry/exit) and investment decisions of rivals (Adam, 2009)7. 
                                                 
5 Global insurance markets are generally recognized as being competitive in terms of the range and 
type of insurance products available to buyers. As noted earlier in section II, the London insurance 
market (of which Lloyd’s of London is an important part) is particularly noted for its innovative and 
competitive nature (A.M. Best, 2012). 
 
6 Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) define predation risk as the risk that cash-rich firms drive their 
financially constrained competitors out of business by reducing their rivals' free cash flows – e.g., 
by under-cutting market prices. 
 
7 Reinsurance purchases by incumbent non-life insurance firms can also influence the strategic 
decisions and growth opportunities of rivals (e.g., new entrants) that may not have the same access 
to levels of reinsurance coverage and/or reinsurance prices (e.g., due to adverse selection issues). 
Such financial advantages of reinsurance partnerships confer competitive advantages on established 
non-life insurers unless rivals can also secure risk transfer/risk-sharing arrangements with 
reinsurers. Data limitations precluded empirical tests on this aspect to be carried out here. However, 
casual observation suggests that reinsurance is critical to the successful entry and survival in 
insurance markets. For example, Admiral plc entered the UK motor insurance market in 1992/3 with 
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Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that because shareholders only hold 
residual claims to free cash flows, efforts to maximize firm value are 
particularly sensitive to the debt-to-equity ratio. Therefore, to compete 
successfully with rivals the managers of highly levered firms will seek to 
reduce debt levels, and the associated agency costs of debt, and so improve 
their competitive product-market positions using risk transfer techniques 
such as reinsurance. However, Campello (2006) argues that increased 
leverage can actually improve the competitive positions of firms in product-
markets. This is because under Jensen’s (1986) ‘free cash flow’ hypothesis, 
the repayment obligations contained in debt covenants reduces agency 
costs without the need for firms to make big investments in risk 
management, and motivates them to generate free cash flows by 
increasing product-market share through investment in productive assets. 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) highlight that in competitive product-
markets predation risk arises from market failure (e.g., agency problems 
and imperfect information). They further argue that costly contracting 
solutions (such as reinsurance) that are designed to mitigate information 
asymmetries between highly indebted firms and their creditors can 
exacerbate liquidity constraints and so stimulate predatory behavior by 
more lowly levered and cash-rich firms.  
Myers and Majluf, (1984) posit that a firm’s performance in competitive 
product-markets depends on its ability to realize growth opportunities and 
increase size. However, protecting liquidity levels and raising external debt 
and equity finance can concomitantly increase agency costs such as those 
arising from the underinvestment and asset substitution incentives and 
managerial entrenchment (Myers, 1977). Zou and Adams (2008) show that 
indemnity contracts (in their case, property insurance) can lower agency 
and frictional market costs of capital thereby reducing the risks (costs) of 
financial distress and/or bankruptcy for firms. Mayers and Smith (1990) 
also argue that reinsurance reduces agency and other costs of contracting 
that can arise in highly levered primary insurers in post-loss states when 
                                                 
substantial reinsurance backing from Munich Re (i.e., with 75% of gross annual premiums written 
being reinsured). Admiral plc is now one of the UK’s leading motor insurer with roughly 15% of 
market share in terms of annual written premiums. 
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external financing costs tend to be high. Therefore, reinsurance is expected 
to be strategically important to cash constrained insurance firms as it not 
only helps them reduce the costs of external finance in imperfect markets 
but also increases their capacity to grow new business premiums by 
increasing underwriting capacity and/or diversifying assumed risks. In turn, 
this capability enables primary insurers to invest in positive NPV projects 
and compete effectively with market rivals.  
Rochet and Villenueve (2011) demonstrate that when liquidity and 
(re)insurance decisions are simultaneously determined, cash-rich firms are 
likely to improve their financial performance to a greater degree relative to 
cash-poor firms. Rochet and Villenueve (2011) contend that in the face of 
financing imperfections and high risk volatility in product-markets, 
(re)insurance allows firms to build-up cash reserves, stabilize investment 
spending, and lower market costs of capital. However, Gamba and Triantis 
(2008) show that the level of a firm’s cash holdings and leverage position 
are not equivalent when future cash flow streams are uncertain, which can 
be the case following a severe but under-(re)insured loss event. Therefore, 
different combinations of cash, debt, and reinsurance could have different 
effects on firms’ strategic competitive product-market positions (e.g., see 
Fresard, 2010). 
Research Hypothesis  
The key research question that emerges from the above literature 
review is: What is the product-market outcome of the purchase of 
reinsurance after controlling for insurers’ leverage, cash position, and size? 
We consider this issue to be an empirical question of some importance. For 
example, low leverage without reinsurance could be viewed by investors, 
regulators, and others not as a ‘positive signal’ (e.g., indicating an insurer 
has low insolvency risk) but rather as a ‘negative signal’ (e.g., indicating 
that an insurer has limited capability to generate future new business at an 
affordable cost of capital). Doherty, Lamm-Tennant and Starks (2003) 
emphasize the solvency management role of reinsurance in enabling 
insurance firms to retain, regain or grow their product-market share in 
post-crisis situations (such as after the terrorist events of 9/11). Regulatory 
intervention can create a negative signal to prospective policyholders and 
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investors as to the future financial viability of insurance firms and as a 
result, lead to a loss of business and decline in product-market share. 
Doherty et al. (2003) and Doherty and Lamm-Tennant (2009) also 
emphasize that, as noted earlier, reinsurance allows primary insurers to 
increase their underwriting capacity, diversify assumed risks, and realize 
potentially profitable investment opportunities in times of uncertainty. 
Moreover, the financial ratings of insurance firms are largely voluntary 
(Adams, Burton and Hardwick, 2003) and so do not apply to all insurers in 
the market. As such, reinsurance provides a more comprehensive and 
easily accessible source of information on insurers' prospects for interested 
parties. These strategic advantages of reinsurance are expected not only 
to reduce the costs of capital for insurers but also to increase product-
market share and associated free cash flows by assuring prospective 
policyholders, brokers, and industry regulators as to the future going 
concern of the insurance provider. The foregoing analysis thus leads us to 
hypothesize that: 
 
H: Reinsurance enables insurers to increase their product-market 
share. 
 
IV. Research Design  
In this section we describe our research design including the 
specification of the modelling procedure, description of the data, and 
definition of the variables used. 
Baseline Model and Main Variables  
The baseline specification that we employ in the present study is 
similar to that used in prior studies examining the linkage between capital 
structure and product-market behavior (e.g., see Opler and Titman, 1994; 
Campello, 2006; Fresard, 2010). Here we use one-step System Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM-SYS) estimation procedure to estimate the 
dynamic relation between reinsurance and the product-market share 
growth of UK non-life insurers over the 24 years 1987 to 2010. The GMM-
SYS specification has been shown to be efficient when there is temporal 
persistence in the endogenous series and unobserved heterogeneity in 
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cross-sectional/time-series firm-level data. To the extent that unobserved 
heterogeneity represents missing and/or non-constant firm/time conditions 
(e.g., the possibility that new products launched by a firm under varying 
market states may affect the intensity of reinsurance over time) then GMM-
SYS goes some way to mitigating the challenging issue of omitted variable 
bias (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002). To 
control for potential endogeneity (e.g., between an insurer’s current 
product-market share and past years’ product-market performance and 
levels of reinsurance held), we use orthogonal deviations as instruments 
for the levels equation to maximize the number of observations utilized in 
the regression model (Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012)8. In addition, to 
minimize the number of GMM-style instruments we use a collapsed form of 
the instrument matrix in our estimation (Roodman, 2009a). The maximum 
lag-depth of untransformed variables utilized as GMM-style instruments for 
each product-market has been kept approximately equal to the average 
number of observations per firm. This approach helps keep the instrument 
count low and so maintain the power of the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions (Roodman, 2009b). Our GMM-SYS model is thus: 
 
           
                   
 
To mitigate the potentially confounding effects of idiosyncratic firm-
effects affecting the coefficient estimates, we adjust all firm-specific 
variables to their industry-year mean. This gives a more precise indicator 
of an insurer’s product-market position in a given year relative to its rivals 
(e.g. see Campello, 2006). We further expect that the annual amount of 
reinsurance purchased will vary across business lines in accordance with 
intrinsic differences in risk profiles and rates of new business growth9. 
                                                 
8  Wintoki et al. (2012) point out that attempts to mitigate endogeneity through the use of 
instrumental variables can be challenging due to the difficulty of identifying suitable instruments. 
However, in sensitivity tests we use developed losses as an instrument for reinsurance ratio as prior 
studies (e.g. Cole and McCullough, 2006) suggest that it directly influences the level of reinsurance.   
9 For example, John, Litov and Yeung (2008) note that corporate risk-taking, and hence the level of 
risk hedging (reinsurance spending), could be greater in lines of business with relatively high rates 
of growth. As a result, reinsurance and product-market growth trends could be driven by latent 
variables. 
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Therefore, following Campello (2006) we standardize the ratio of annual 
reinsurance premiums ceded to gross annual premiums written (hereafter 
referred to as the ‘reinsurance ratio’) for each firm-year across all product-
markets. This approach further enhances the ability of the variable REINS 
(named zREINS after standardization) to more precisely measure an 
insurance firm’s product-market position relative to that of its competitors. 
This arises as any competitive advantage to an insurer imparted by a higher 
reinsurance ratio depends on the dispersion of that ratio across the cross-
sectional sample for a particular year in each line of business10.  
In our model, the dependent variable ∆PMSHAREit represents year-
on-year growth in product-market share for insurance firm ‘i’, where the 
product-market share of firm ‘i’ for a given year in a particular line is 
calculated as the ratio of net premiums written by the firm to total net 
premiums written at the industry level11. Our model also contains a lag of 
the dependent variable (∆PMSHAREit-1) to account for recent firm-specific 
initiatives (e.g., the adoption of new technology) that might influence an 
insurer’s product-market performance.  
The main explanatory variable of interest in our model is zREINSi,t-1 
which gauges the impact of reinsurance on ∆PMSHARE. To alleviate the 
possibility that the relation between product-market share and growth in 
the amount of reinsurance purchased by insurance firms may be 
endogenous we regress growth in product-market share on the reinsurance 
ratio (the level of reinsurance). Such an approach is useful because the 
reinsurance ratio represents the cumulative effects of reinsurance decisions 
                                                 
 
10 For standardization to be viable it is a requisite that the distribution of the reinsurance ratio is 
uni-modal and not highly skewed. To alleviate the potentially confounding effects of outliers we 
winsorize our variables at the 5% level at each tail. 
  
11 Net written premiums represent firm/industry turnover (price x quantity of risk coverage) and so 
represents a standard measure of productive activity in insurance markets. However, an insurer can 
increase its premiums by increasing risks assumed at higher prices rather than increasing the volume 
of new business sales per se. This raises the possibility of omitted variable bias. Therefore, in 
sensitivity tests we use the change in by-line claims incurred to total incurred claims as an alternative 
proxy of firm/market output. However, this measure may also be an imprecise proxy due to delays 
in reporting the quantum of losses particularly in so-called long-tail lines such as legal liability 
insurance. In the event, the two measures of product-market share were positively correlated and 
the empirical results qualitatively unchanged. Therefore, we conclude that omitted variable bias is 
not a significant issue in the present study. 
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taken in past periods, which reduces the potential for reverse causality 
between ∆PMSHARE and zREINS. We acknowledge that ∆PMSHARE may 
not adjust instantaneously to changes in the amounts of reinsurance 
purchased each year. Consequently, we use the first-lag of zREINS to allow 
for an insurer’s product-market share to adjust to annual changes in the 
amount of reinsurance purchased 12 . This procedure also captures the 
impact of multi-period arrangements that often characterize non-life 
reinsurance treaties, and further reduces the possibility of endogeneity 
between the dependent variable and the reinsurance ratio. In our model, 
we also control for five other firm-specific factors – leverage, liquidity, firm 
size, profitability, and selling expenses - that could influence the product-
market performance of an insurer. Our motivation for entering these 
explanatory variables into our regression analysis is outlined briefly below. 
Control Variables 
To capture capital structure-effects on the product-market 
performance of insurance firms, we include leverage (LEV), as a control 
variable in our specification (e.g., see MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Campello, 
2006). LEV is calculated as the annual ratio of net total liabilities (difference 
between total assets and policyholders’ surplus)13 . Capital constrained 
insurance firms are likely to be at greater risk of financial distress and/or 
bankruptcy and as such, they are likely to have greater difficulty in 
attracting new customers and grow product-market share than insurers 
that are in a stronger financial condition (Zanjani, 2002). 
Liquidity could also affect the product-market performance of firms 
(Fresard, 2010). However, as noted earlier, Gamba and Triantis (2008) 
note that a firm can retain a healthy stock of cash even if it is highly levered 
(e.g., in order to make future debt repayments). Therefore, highly levered 
insurers could generate free cash flows by increasing new business 
premiums. Therefore, a positive association can arise between the level of 
liquidity and leverage position of insurance firms. As a result, we control 
for the level of cash holdings (LIQ) in our model and measure LIQ as the 
                                                 
12 The change in the level of reinsurance purchased each year can either increase upwards (e.g., in 
anticipation of a more risky environment) or downwards (e.g., in periods of cash constraint). 
13 This variable is computed using all the values aggregated at the total business level as data on 
the by-line segregation of assets and surplus are not publicly available. 
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ratio of year-end values of cash (and cash equivalents) to total net 
provisions.  
Additionally, size could impact on an insurer’s ability to grow product-
market share irrespective of the amount of reinsurance purchased – for 
example, big insurance firms tend to be naturally more diversified and have 
higher franchise values than small insurance firms (Zanjani, 2002). 
However, we expect liquidity to be decreasing in proportion with increased 
firm size as large firms are relatively less likely than small firms to rely on 
accumulated cash reserves to realize future growth options – for example, 
due to their ability to generally raise external finance at lower costs. 
Therefore, to capture the effect of firm size on product-market performance 
as well as its interaction with other variables, we include firm size (SIZE) 
as a control variable in our model. SIZE is calculated as the natural log of 
total assets as the size of the firms in the insurance industry tends to be 
log-normally distributed.  
The product-market share of an insurance firm can also be directly 
influenced by prior years’ sales enhancing measures such as commissions 
paid to distributors and resources invested in internet technology (Brown 
and Goolsbee, 2002). Therefore, to account for interactions between these 
new business acquisition expenditures and an insurer’s product-market 
performance, we include previous year’s sales and advertising expense 
(SEXPi,1-t) as a control variable in our specification. We define SEXP as total 
selling and advertising expenses incurred in acquiring new business scaled 
by the gross premiums written, where total selling expenses are the sum 
of sales commissions incurred (paid and payable) plus other new business 
acquisition costs. 
The generation of period earnings enables insurers to innovate and 
increase strategic investments in positive NPV projects. This attribute 
cansignal future financial strength to insurance markets and allow 
profitable insurers to command higher prices, which in turn leads to more 
profits, and growth of product-market share. In our model, PROFITi,t-1  is 
represented by the return on assets for each year and is calculated as the 
ratio of annual total pre-tax profit to total assets. A lagged variable is used 
as higher profits in a given period can enhance an insurance firm’s ability 
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to finance infrastructural initiatives to increase future product-market share 
(Campello, 2006). 
 
 
 
Additional Control and Instrument Variables 
Besides the control variables included in our baseline specification, 
few other variables may also have an effect on the product-market share 
growth of insurers. For example, Garven and Loubergé (1996) point out 
that reinsurance can be transacted in international reinsurance markets 
and/or internally via the reinsurance subsidiaries of conglomerate 
insurance groups. Garven and Loubergé (1996) report that both ways of 
transacting reinsurance can have economic advantages that can help 
primary insurers grow product-market share. For example, external 
reinsurers can provide ceding insurers with valuable risk management 
advice, whilst internal reinsurance can help insurers realize economic 
benefits from savings in frictional costs. As a result, we model the effect of 
the use of external and internal reinsurance by incorporating a dummy 
variable (GROUPi,t-1 ), which equals 1 where an insurer is a member of a 
conglomerate, and 0 otherwise. 
As with size, we expect more diversified insurers to have a greater 
capacity to underwrite new business and thus achieve a higher growth in 
product-market share. Highly diversified insurers are also more likely to 
have greater access to various distribution channels that allow them to 
reach a larger number of potential customers, resulting in a higher growth 
in product-market share. Therefore, we use the line of business Herfindahl 
index as a measure of diversification. The line of business Herfindahl index 
is calculated as sum of square the share of individual lines in the total 
premiums written by an insurer in a given year. As mentioned in footnote 
8, we test the sensitivity of our results using developed losses as an 
instrument for reinsurance in a two-stage IV estimation. Previous studies 
on determinants of reinsurance, such as Cole and McCullough (2006) use 
developed losses as one of the determinants of the reinsurance. Moreover, 
developed losses from prior years are unlikely to have a direct bearing on 
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product-market share growth; however, they are expected to directly affect 
the level of premiums ceded by the primary insurers to their reinsurers. 
This makes developed losses a valid instrument for our study. We therefore 
define DEVLOSi,t-1 as the ratio of developed losses (for the past year) to 
total annual reserves. All the variables that enter our regression analysis 
are summarized in Table I 
 
[Insert Table I here] 
Firm/Time-Specific Effects 
The notations ηi and vt in our model represent unobserved firm-specific 
and time-specific effects respectively. Due to the presence of both mono-
line as well as multi-line insurers of varying sizes and ownership structures 
(e.g., management-owned) in our dataset, we expect there to be firm 
heterogeneity; hence the variable ηi is included in the model to account for 
it. Additionally, to control for time effects which are likely to be present 
over a period of 24 years in an industrial sector that is well-known to be 
cyclical (Cummins and Danzon, 1997), we include time (year) dummies in 
our regression.   
Data Description 
We fit our GMM-SYS model to unbalanced (1987-2010) panel data for 
insurance firms operating in five main lines of non-life insurance business, 
namely: motor, property, legal liability, personal accident, and 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss insurance. We also estimate the same 
regression at the total business level of the insurance firm to investigate 
the cumulative effect of reinsurance on overall annual changes in product-
market share. The five product-markets analyzed comprise approximately 
95% of insurance underwritten in the UK’s non-life insurance sector. All 
data relate to UK non-life insurers taken from the Standard and Poor’s 
Synthesys insurance companies’ database for the 24 years, 1987 to 2010 
– a period when UK non-life insurers were in varying states of financial 
condition. The financial data that we use are sourced from the regulatory 
returns submitted annually by UK insurance companies to the insurance 
industry regulator - the FSA. The selected period of analysis represents the 
earliest and latest years for which complete data were available at the time 
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our study was carried out. Also, we consider that the duration covered by 
our data set is sufficiently long to account for the possible effects of 
insurance underwriting cycles on our results. 
Our data set includes independently operating and reporting non-life 
insurance companies licensed by the FSA to conduct property-liability 
insurance business in the UK.14 Very small non-life insurance providers 
(including mutual fire insurance pools) and public sector insurance 
arrangements are excluded from the sample either because they do not 
directly and/or actively write much insurance business and/or complete 
data are not available. Furthermore, the vast majority of insurers in our 
data set (approximately 95%) are stock forms of organization, and the 
majority of these are non-publicly listed entities15. Underwriting syndicates 
operating at Lloyd’s are also excluded due to the unavailability of public 
data, their unique (triennial) system of accounting that was in place during 
much of our period of analysis16, and the different organizational structure 
of syndicates at Lloyd’s compared with conventional insurance firms (e.g., 
Lloyd’s syndicates are often owned and administered by managing 
agencies). 
Firm-years for which any one or more of equity, assets or reserves 
were reported as negative are also excluded from our data set. Moreover, 
in the interest of preserving the panel structure of our data, firms without 
two complete sets of observations are left out of the estimation sample. 
There are a handful of insurance firms in our sample that have been 
involved in mergers and acquisitions during our period of analysis. Some of 
them are key players in the UK insurance market and excluding them from 
our study could bias our results. Consequently, to circumvent this problem, 
we treat these conglomerate insurance groups as two separate entities – 
i.e., pre-and-post merger and/or acquisition. We further test for outliers in 
                                                 
14 The annual statutory returns do not provide consolidated financial statements for insurance groups 
and so we cannot conduct detailed tests on an intra-group basis. However, affilates/subsidiaries of 
insurers operating in the UK tend to have considerable discretion over reinsurance decisions in order 
to respond to prevailing product-market conditions and realize economic (e.g., tax)  benefits as well 
as local regulatory (e.g., capital) requirements . 
15 The preponderance of non-publicly listed stock insurers precludes the need for us to control for 
both organizational form and listing status in the present study. 
 
16 Lloyd’s moved from a three years to annual system of accounting based on UK generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) on 1 January 2005. 
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the lower and upper tails of the distribution of our data set and find that 
ΔPMSHARE and PROFIT have the highest number of outliers at 689 and 836 
outliers respectively. In order to minimize the effect of these extreme 
values, we winsorize all the variables used in estimations at top and bottom 
five percentile of observations in order to root-out extremities in the data17. 
In the next section, we briefly describe the key summary statistics for our 
sample that are reported in Table II. 
 
[Insert Table II here] 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 In this section of the paper we present and analyze our empirical 
results. 
 Summary Statistics 
Table II indicates that the size of insurance firms in our sample does 
not vary much by product-market, though there is some observable 
variation in sample sizes across market segments. This feature indicates 
that not all insurers in our data set serve all five insurance segments that 
are the focus of the present study. Average growth in product-market share 
(winsorized) for the five lines examined over the period of analysis range 
from 8% to 14%, although at the total business level it trails-off to an 
overall average of 6%. Similarly, standard deviations relative to the 
respective mean values across different lines suggest consistent rates of 
growth across the entire property-liability insurance market. Maximum 
values of by-business market share are also large relative to the 
corresponding average values. This could be due to the new entry of more 
(price and product) competitive insurers that make gains in product-market 
share in the early years of operation as the result of the adoption of new 
technology and/or other innovative business strategies (Brown and 
Goolsbee, 2002).   
                                                 
17 Alternative tests to control for the potentially confounding effects of extreme values (e.g., using 
logged values) did not yield intuitively meaningful results. Therefore, we consider winsorization to 
be the best way to control for extremities in our data set. In sensitivity tests conducted using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) at the total business level and Generalized Second-stage 
Least Squares (G2SLS) instrumental variable procedure, we use variables winsorized at the first 
percentile of each tail. However, the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table II indicates that average reinsurance ratios show more variation 
across segments of the non-life insurance market compared with rates of 
product-market share growth. Also, average levels of reinsurance to gross 
premiums written across the panel sample range from 15% in motor 
insurance to over 30% in property, liability, and miscellaneous and 
pecuniary lines of business. This observation further hints that insurers 
operating in different lines of business tend to have inherently different risk 
profiles and hence different demand profiles for reinsurance. Indeed, our 
expectation is that, all else equal, insurers underwriting standard and 
predictable risk business (e.g., motor insurance) are likely to have less 
need for reinsurance than their counterparts underwriting more complex 
and unpredictable risk business (e.g., legal liability and catastrophe risks) 
(e.g., see Froot, 2001; Froot and O’Connell, 2008; Ibragimov, Jaffee, and 
Walden, 2009). This view tends to be borne out by Table II, which 
illustrates that the average by-line reinsurance ratio ranges from 14% to 
38%, with motor (a fairly predictable risk line) and miscellaneous and 
pecuniary loss (a relatively less predictable line) recording the lowest and 
highest values respectively. The average levels of leverage winsorized at 
5% (in both tails) range from 13% for motor insurance to 17% for the 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss line of insurance. Such a fairly uniform 
distribution of financial structure across segments of the market could 
highlight the fact that insurance is largely a solvency-regulated business 
where maintaining a consistent and moderate leverage ratio is of 
paramount importance to industry regulators (Mayers and Smith, 1990). A 
similar logic seems to apply to the dispersion of leverage as standard 
deviations across all lines as well as at the total business level takes a value 
of approximately 0.11. Average liquidity levels in our sample also appear 
to be highly variable across product-markets with values respectively 
ranging from 0.41 to 0.87 for motor and personal accident lines of business. 
Moreover, lines of insurance showing the greatest gains in product-market 
share tend to have higher liquidity levels, suggesting that as Rochet and 
Villeneuve (2011) argue, strategic capital, risk and liquidity management 
decisions tend to closely mirror growth opportunities in product-markets.  
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Table II reveals that a potentially key determinant of product-market 
share growth - selling expenses - varies across different lines of insurance 
business. Interestingly, this variable also tracks the average level of share 
growth across different market segments such that lines experiencing high 
rates of product-market growth tend to incur high selling costs. Average 
selling expenses for our sample range from 18% of gross premiums written 
in case of standard motor insurance to 31% in case of the more specialized 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss line of insurance business. However, at 
the total business level the mean annual value of selling expenses drops 
sharply to about 9% of gross premiums written. This trend implies that 
selling expenses rise when managers target lines of risk business that have 
sound strategic growth prospects such as miscellaneous and pecuniary loss 
products (e.g., financial and trade guarantee insurance). However, average 
profitability for all the insurers in our data both by-line and aggregate 
business level is modest - ranging from 2% to 4% of total assets. This 
result suggests that over the period of our analysis non-life insurance was 
generally not a high margin business.  
Line of business Herfindahl Index (HHI) and the group membership 
identifier (GROUP) are the additional control variables that are used in 
robustness tests. The vast majority of observations in our sample 
correspond to insurers with presence in more than one line of insurance. 
Liability insurance business has the lowest proportion of mono-line (“pure-
play”) insurers (only 2.5%), whereas personal accident business has the 
highest proportion with approximately 12% of firm/year observations. 
Overall the nearly 20% of firm/year observations belong to mono-line 
companies. This also indicates that most of the firms in our estimation 
sample are multi-line insurers with a mean HHI of 0.62 at the total business 
level. Average HHI varies slightly among the product markets with liability 
insurers being the most diversified with a mean HHI of 0.45 and 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss line having the highest mean of 0.54.  
Similarly most of the companies in our estimation sample are affiliated to 
a group with only about 15% of observations relating to firms with no group 
affiliation. The proportion of observations corresponding to non-group 
 21 
companies range from a low of about 12% for personal accident insurance 
business to a high of approximately 17% for liability insurance business.  
We turn next to the correlation coefficient analysis. As different 
regressions are run for different product-markets, we compute correlation 
coefficients for nine sets of key variables. Whereas the same values of LIQ, 
LEV, SIZE, SEXP, PROFIT, HHI and GROUP are used in all the regressions; 
values of ∆PMSHARE, zREINS and DEVLOS change by line of insurance. 
Correlation coefficients corresponding to respective product-markets and 
total business level are reported in panels A to F in Table III. 
 
[Insert Table III here] 
 Table III shows a weak, but statistically significant and positive 
correlation (at the 1% level, two-tail) between the dependent variable 
(∆PMSHARE) and main explanatory variable zREINS. Table II indicates 
consistent correlation coefficients of approximately 0.15 across all product-
markets except at the total business level, where the coefficient drops down 
to 0.08. However, the association between the dependent variable and its 
lag is not consistent across different lines of insurance and statistically 
significant at conventional levels only for three product-markets (motor, 
property, and personal accident) and at the total business level. 
Furthermore, the correlation coefficient ranges from 0.10 for personal 
accident insurance to 0.15 for motor insurance. These relatively low 
correlations suggest that product-market growth momentum over time is 
weak – for example, as a result of growing competition. In addition, 
∆PMSHARE is significant and negative, but weakly correlated (at the 5% 
level or better, two-tail) with SIZE across all lines of business with the 
degree of correlation being similar for all lines. This result indicates that 
large insurers tend to find it difficult to sustain high levels of product-
market share growth year-on-year. That is, the same absolute value of 
growth translates into a lower percentage for larger insurance firms relative 
to smaller insurance firms.  
In our dataset, moderate and statistically significant correlation 
coefficients (at the 1% level, two-tail) are observed between zREINS and 
LEV with coefficients ranging from 0.29 to 0.46 across different product-
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markets. This observation accords with some prior studies (e.g., Shiu, 
2011) and suggests that highly levered insurers tend to buy more 
reinsurance than lowly levered insurance firms. Table III further indicates 
negative and statistically significant correlations (at the 1% level, two-tail) 
between firm size and the reinsurance ratio indicating that compared with 
small insurers, large insurers are likely to be relatively less reliant on 
reinsurance – for example, because they tend to be more naturally 
diversified. Moreover, larger insurers generally have greater access to 
capital markets than small insurers, and as such, they have relatively more 
options to raise risk finance (Jarzabkowski, Bednareh, Burke, Cabantous 
and Smets, 2012). Moderate but statistically significant inverse correlations 
(at the 1% level, two-tail) between firm size and liquidity reported in Table 
III also implies that large insurers tend to hold proportionately fewer liquid 
assets than their smaller counterparts, and rely more on future cash flows 
from in-force business to maintain future solvency levels and underwriting 
capacity.  
HHI has a strong negative correlation with size and the group 
identifier across all the lines of insurance. This is expected as larger insurers 
are usually more diversified firms, and they also tend to be part of a 
conglomerate group. Similarly, there is a negative correlation between HHI 
and zREINS for some lines as more diversified insurers (lower HHI score) 
tend to cede a lower proportion of their premiums compared with their less 
diversified counterparts. As expected, DEVLOS variable is statistically 
significantly correlated with zREINS thereby supporting its use as an 
instrument for the reinsurance ratio. 
 
Multivariate Results  
GMM Diagnostics 
As noted earlier, one-step GMM-SYS is used to test the research 
hypothesis put forward in section II. Although the two-step GMM-SYS 
estimator is asymptotically superior, the finite sample properties of the 
one-step GMM-SYS estimator are more useful than two-step estimator. For 
instance, Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (1998, p.18) state that “ . . . in finite 
samples, the asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM 
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estimators can be seriously biased downwards, and thus form an unreliable 
guide for inference”. Blundell and Bond (1998) also suggest that apart from 
being asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, finite sample estimates 
of the one-step system estimator are more reliable and consistent. To 
minimize the risk of biased standard errors due to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation between firm/years, our regression is estimated using 
robust standard errors. We run our baseline specification individually for 
each line of insurance business and present the consolidated results in 
Table IV.  
 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 To check the validity of our model’s specification and instruments 
used in the GMM-SYS estimation, the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions, and the Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM-style 
instruments are reported in Table IV. The results of Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions given in Table IV indicate that our GMM-SYS 
specification is not over-identified. Furthermore, the Hansen test for 
exogeneity of GMM-style instruments does not reject the null hypothesis of 
instrument validity and so indicates that the instrument set used is suitable 
in context of our specification. Moreover, in accordance with our 
expectations, AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) statistics reported in Table IV above 
confirm the presence of first-order autocorrelation in error term in 
differences (significant at the 1% level, two-tail) across all the business 
lines; while second order autocorrelation too is statistically significant at 
10% level (two-tail) in the case of property insurance. Our dataset admits 
lags equal to or higher than two as GMM–style instruments for all the 
product-markets investigated. Hence, we estimate our specification using 
lags ranging from second lag to the twelfth lag in our estimations. As 
discussed in section III (A), the upper limit of lag depth is set approximately 
equal to the average number of observations per group for each product-
market examined. The instrument count reported for each line of business 
also remains at an acceptable range, i.e., below the number of firms 
included in the estimation for each segment of the non-life insurance 
market examined. 
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Main Results 
 Consistent with what was hypothesized our main explanatory variable 
- zREINS - has a statistically significant and positive impact on ∆PMSHARE 
at the 10% level (two-tail) or better across all lines of insurance business. 
However, the influence of zREINS on ∆PMSHARE shows slight by-line 
variation with the greatest impact being experienced in the property 
insurance sector. This reflects the exposure of property to increased 
catastrophe risks such as flooding and storm damage as a result of factors 
such as lax development controls and climate change (e.g., see Browne 
and Hoyt, 2000). Our results establish economic significance of reinsurance 
as a strategic tool as after controlling for five control variables, one 
standard deviation increase in the reinsurance ratio from the industry-year 
mean leads to product-market share growth (above their line-year mean) 
in the range of 13% in motor insurance to 21% in property insurance18. 
Contrary to what was expected, Table IV shows that ∆PMSHAREi,t-1 
does not influence insurers’ ability to realize growth in all product-markets 
except for property insurance where the lagged dependent variable is 
significant (at the 5% level, two-tail). The lagged dependent variable is, 
however, statistically significant (at the 1% level, two-tail) at the total 
business level. The economic effect gleaned from Table IV is that a standard 
deviation increase in the product-market share growth from industry-year 
mean in year t-1 grows product-market share by 7.8% points in year t. 
These results could reflect a ‘momentum-effect’ in the rate of growth in the 
product-market share of insurance firms as a result of past investment 
(e.g., in new technology). Similarly, the coefficient estimate for LEVi,t-1 is 
only negative and statistically significant in the case of property insurance 
and at the total business level (at the 10% and 1% levels two-tail, 
respectively). At the total business level, a standard deviation reduction in 
leverage below the product-market year average leads to a 6.5% points 
gain in product-market share in the next year.  
Prior research (e.g., Campello, 2006) predicts that high leverage levels 
in the past can lead to a current loss of product-market share for firms 
                                                 
18 The economic significance is computed as follows: for example, for motor insurance 2.6% points 
= 0.20 (standard deviation per Table II) x 0.13 (coefficient estimate per Table IV). 
 25 
because of the heightened effects of financial distress and insolvency. 
Consequently, an increase in insurers’ leverage, particularly in competitive 
sectors, such as property insurance, could be perceived by brokers/agents 
and policyholders as increasing the probability of ruin. This could trigger a 
‘flight to quality’ and a consequential loss of product-market share for 
highly levered insurance firms operating in competitive segments of the 
market. However, as previous studies (e.g., Doherty and Tinic, 1981; 
Doherty et al., 2003; Weiss and Chung, 2004) point out, reinsurance can 
be used to mitigate the risk of financial distress and/or bankruptcy for 
highly levered insurance firms and so enable them to assure prospective 
policyholders and so grow product-market share in competitive lines of 
insurance business19. 
Table IV illustrates that LIQi,1-t has a statistically significant effect on 
product-market share growth for two lines – personal accident and legal 
liability insurance (at the 10% and 5% levels two-tail, respectively). Not 
surprisingly, these two lines also show the highest variation in levels of 
liquidity (i.e., in terms of the high standard deviation relative to the mean 
value of liquidity). Hence, firms with high liquidity ratios relative to their 
rivals tend to have competitive advantages in personal accident and legal 
liability lines of insurance. However, the economic significance of the 
‘liquidity effect’ is modest in that a unit increase in the liquidity ratio above 
the product-market year mean improves product-market share by roughly 
10% to 11% points for personal accident and legal liability insurance. One 
plausible explanation for this observation is that indemnity contracts such 
as reinsurance can help insurers protect their cash resources against 
depletion as a result of greater than anticipated loss events. This attribute 
can help primary insurers not only to protect their solvency margins but 
also enable them to realize positive NPV projects in their investment 
opportunity sets (Doherty, 2000). The cash protection facility of 
                                                 
19 As was noted earlier in section V, a direct association between zREINS and LEV is observed in our 
estimation sample across all product-markets. Therefore, to test the robustness of our estimates to 
multicollinearity that may arise due to high correlation between the regressors, we re-estimated our 
model using an alternative specification that excluded LEV. The results obtained from these 
estimations are qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper. We also re-estimated our model 
with annual sales growth as the dependent variable. Annual sales growth is defined as the annual 
change in net premiums written. Again, the coefficient estimates are similar to those originally 
estimated, and so in the interest of brevity they are not reported here. 
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reinsurance could become more important for UK (and indeed, EU) insurers 
as a result of the more stringent capital maintenance and risk management 
rules of Solvency II that are due to be implemented after 1 January 2016. 
It is possible that the statutory solvency monitoring regulations that 
characterize the UK, and other insurance markets could help explain the 
apparent inconsistency with regard the liquidity findings of recent cross-
sectional research (e.g., Fresard, 2010). This research suggests that cash 
rich firms are likely to secure product-market share gains at the expense 
of cash constrained rivals, particularly after macroeconomic shocks such as 
the recent global financial crisis.  
With regard to firm size, we observe that product-market share growth 
does not respond consistently to variations in size across all product-
markets. The coefficient estimate for SIZEi,t-1 is statistically significant and 
negative for two lines of business, namely motor insurance and 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss (at the 1% and 5% levels, two-tail, 
respectively). This finding suggests that over the period of analysis, small 
insurers operating in these two segments of the market have increased new 
business at the expense of larger competitors – for example, as a result of 
product innovation and/or the use of new technology20. Additionally, in such 
niche segments of the non-life insurance market the real advisory services 
of reinsurers could provide another competitive benefit to small but 
innovative niche players (e.g., see Jean Baptiste and Santomero, 2000)21. 
Prior studies (e.g., MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Adam et al., 2007; 
Campello et al., 2011) make clear that compared with small firms large 
entities are often better placed to use their brand profile and stock of cash 
resources to improve their market share through geographical as well as 
product-market diversification. However, in the present study the observed 
relation is reversed for the lagged value of firm size, suggesting that the 
                                                 
20 For example, Direct Line is a typical example of a relatively small (in terms of assets-in-place) but 
specialist UK-based insurer operating in the motor insurance segment of the non-life insurance 
market. 
 
21 Since the size of an insurer tends to correspond closely with its age, we include firm age as an 
explanatory variable to test the robustness of our results to the length of time an insurer has been 
operating in the respective product-markets that are the focus of the present study. We find that 
whereas age is a statistically significant predictor for motor insurance line (at p≤0.1, two tailed), the 
same is not true for other lines. However, the interpretation of our results remains largely unchanged 
after inclusion of the firm age variable. 
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effect of ‘firm size inflation’ in the past years could result in a loss of 
product-market share in the future as large insurance firms lose their 
competitive edge to smaller rivals operating in niche segments of the 
market. This might be due to combination of factors – for example, 
managerial inertia in the case of larger insurers and/or the possibility that 
new entrants in a product-market grow very fast in the early years as a 
result of competitive pricing, more innovative products, and/or providing 
better quality customer services.  
Table IV reveals that the lagged values of new business acquisition 
expenses to gross premiums written (sales) ratio (i.e., SEXPi,1-t) does not 
have the expected positive effect on the product-market share growth of 
insurance firms. This observation therefore suggests that overall, the UK’s 
non-life insurance market has for many years been operating at, or close 
to, saturation point with limited scope for new business growth. 
Furthermore, Profitt-1 (return on assets) does not have any discernible 
effect on the product-market performance of UK non-life insurers except 
for those operating in the motor insurance sector. It is therefore likely that 
due to the lower barriers of entry and competitive nature of the motor 
vehicle insurance segment of the market more efficient and profitable firms 
experience higher market share growth as well. Such efficiency 
enhancements may be the result of investments in new technology and/or 
business processes which come as a consequence of highly profitable 
operations.  
Robustness Tests 
 We test the sensitivity of our baseline results reported above using 
an instrumental variable (IV) estimator based on the G2SLS approach. The 
model we use is essentially a random-effects estimator that instruments 
the reinsurance ratio by developed losses, and includes additional control 
variables GROUPi,t-1 and HHIi,t-1. Since GROUP is a time invariant variable 
for all the firms in our sample, the use of a fixed-effects estimator is ruled 
out. Moreover, our data being derived from a single industry, it is likely to 
meet the assumptions of the random-effects model, which allows us to 
include the group identifier in our estimation. We further assume that firm-
specific effects in our data are random realizations of a data generating 
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process common to all insurers. Table V reports the second-stage results 
from this estimation. The equation is exactly identified as only one 
instrument has been used for the reinsurance ratio, the main endogenous 
variable. There is a slight difference in the sample sizes between our 
baseline and IV estimates because the number of observations available 
for estimation in IV regressions is dependent on the availability of 
observations of the instrument. The IV estimation includes two more 
variables than the baseline model, namely HINDX and GROUP, which is 
likely to result in coefficient estimates that are different from the baseline 
model. Moreover, in the case of the IV estimates, the winsorization has 
been done at first percentile at each tail, which results in a larger variation 
in values of our variables. Furthermore, based on the minimum covariance 
determinant of Rousseeuw (1985), approximately 10% of total 
observations remain influential after winsorization at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles at the lower and upper tails respectively. The difference in 
coefficient estimates of Tables IV and V appears to be the cumulative effect 
of these extreme values.  
[Insert Table V here] 
The estimates at the total business level are in agreement with the 
baseline estimates. The coefficient estimates for the property insurance 
business are also similar in sign and significance to the baseline estimates, 
though differ in magnitude22. To examine further the time-sensitivity of our 
results to changing macro-economic and insurance market conditions we 
conducted a sensitivity test for the effects of the 2007/8 global financial 
crisis using a dummy variable - CRISISit - that represents 1 before 2008, 
and 0 otherwise. However, our results (unreported) indicate that the 
variable CRISISit does not have any statistically significant effect on market 
share growth in any of the lines investigated. Moreover, the estimates 
                                                 
22 Some of the coefficients in Table V are quite large in magnitude and we suspect that few influential 
values of respective variables drive these results. Owing to this limitation, we do not attach economic 
significance to these results and present them here only as tests for direction of relations rather 
than as predictive estimates. To investigate the possibility whether the magnitudes of coefficients 
are influenced by the magnitude of observations, we investigate the effect of the variation in cession 
rates on market share growth in the following section. 
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produced by these regressions are in line with those produced by IV 
regressions.  
Test for Non-linearity 
Although the aforementioned analysis reveals that there is a positive 
relation between the reinsurance ratio and market-share growth, there is 
still a possibility that this relation is non-monotonic. To investigate this 
possibility, we conducted further regressions after parsing the dataset into 
four subsets based on quartiles of lagged value of zREINS.  
 
[Insert Table VI & Figure 1 here] 
Table VI reports the results of these regressions, which reveal that 
though the relation between the reinsurance ratio and the market share 
growth is positive for all the subsets of observations, it is statistically 
significant only for observations corresponding to higher than the median 
reinsurance ratio. It can also be observed that the magnitude of coefficient 
estimates corresponding to varying level of reinsurance ratio vary from one 
quartile to another. As shown by Figure 1, this outcome suggests that the 
firms with higher than median reinsurance ratio experience higher product-
market share growth than their less reinsured rivals adding weight to 
conclusions drawn using preceding analyses. This also hints at a piecewise 
linear relation between the dependent and the main explanatory variable. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Utilizing a one-step dynamic panel data design (GMM-SYS) on data 
gathered from five main segments of the UK’s non-life insurance market 
for 1987 to 2010 we find that overall reinsurance plays an important role 
in enabling insurers to realize gains in product-market share. Specifically, 
we observe that an increase in reinsurance leads to significant gains in 
product-market share for insurers at the expense of insurers that are less 
reinsured. However, the extent of the realized gain in product-market share 
differs across business lines as a result of variations in the type and scale 
of risks insured as well as by-line differences in the use of reinsurance.  
We also find that the effect of reinsurance in securing growth in 
product-market share is amplified for highly levered insurers at the total 
 30 
business level but not at the individual product-market level, with the 
exception of property insurance. Similarly, insurers’ liquidity levels do not 
influence growth in product-markets except in two lines – personal accident 
and legal liability insurance. This could reflect ‘liquidity convergence’ among 
insurers as a result of statutory minimum solvency requirements. Indeed, 
this process could be exacerbated after 2016 with the implementation of 
the EU’s new Solvency II risk-based capital maintenance rules. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the rate of product-market share growth to 
changes in leverage varies across business lines. However, possible 
negative impacts on product-market share growth due to past increases in 
insurers’ leverage levels could be mitigated by purchasing reinsurance.  
Surprisingly, except for motor vehicle and miscellaneous and pecuniary 
loss lines of insurance, firm size does not appear to be a vital factor in 
driving growth in product-market share. In these business lines small 
(niche) insurance firms appear to have captured relatively more gains in 
product-market share from using reinsurance than large insurers. This 
observation further suggests that the risk management and other real 
advisory services provided by reinsurers could help smaller innovative 
players in these market segments to mitigate inherent advantages 
bestowed by larger firm size such as brand-name recognition and ability to 
effectively diversify risks underwritten.  
Our research results could have potential commercial and/or public 
policy implications. For example, managers of highly levered insurance 
firms could purchase reinsurance to increase future cash flows from 
opportune infrastructural/new technology investments that grow product-
market share at the expense of competitors. This attribute could provide 
comfort to investors, policyholders, industry regulators, and others as to 
the probability of highly levered insurance firms remaining as going 
concerns. In addition, our observation that reinsurance enables small 
(niche) insurers to improve their position in competitive product-markets, 
such as motor insurance, suggests that it enhances consumer choice and 
lowers prices. This attribute is likely to be of policy relevance to industry 
regulators, legislators, consumer groups, amongst others that have an 
interest in the efficient and effective operation of insurance markets. 
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 Finally, the strategic impact of risk management techniques, such as 
reinsurance, is an important but relatively under-researched area in the 
finance literature. We believe that the results of this study could help spawn 
some interesting future strategic risk finance research from insurance 
markets in other (e.g., developing) countries as well as different industrial 
sectors of the economy (e.g., banking).  
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Table I 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: Definition of Variables 
This table presents the labels of the key variables used in the study together with their full 
description. 
Variable Represents Description 
∆PMSHAREi,t 
Product-market 
share growth 
PMSHAREit is the by-line amount of annual 
growth in net premiums written (NPW).  
∆PMSHAREi,t is calculated as PMSHAREi,t minus 
PMSHAREi,t-1 divided by PMSHAREi,t-1, minus the 
industry/line year mean. 
zREINSi,t 
Level of 
reinsurance 
ceded 
By-line amount of reinsurance premiums ceded 
in year t divided by the gross insurance 
premiums written in year t. 
LIQi,t 
Level of cash 
holdings 
Ratio of cash (& cash equivalents) to net 
provisions and reserves in year t. 
LEVi,t Leverage 
Difference between total assets and total 
surplus (sum of Equity and Reserves) scaled by 
total assets in year t 
SIZEi,t Firm size Natural log of total assets in year t. 
SEXPi,t 
Business 
acquisition 
expenses 
 
Total selling and advertising expenses (total of 
commissions paid/payable to distributors plus 
other acquisition costs) scaled by the gross 
premiums written in year t. 
PROFITi,t Return on assets 
Ratio of earnings before tax to total assets in 
year t. 
HHI 
Line of business 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
Sum of square of share of each line in a firm’s 
annual premiums written. 
GROUP 
Group 
membership 
Takes value 1 if insurer is part of a group and 0 
otherwise. 
DEVLOS 
Developed loss 
ratio 
Developed losses over the past year scaled by 
total surplus. 
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Table II 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: Descriptive 
Statistics 
This table reports the overall (winsorized at 5% level at each tail (except for HHI and GROUP)) 
descriptive statistics of the estimation sample by line of insurance business for the entire period of 
analysis. All variables are as defined in Table I. 
Variable Statistic Motor Property 
Legal 
Liability 
Pers. 
Acc. 
Misc. & 
Pecuniar
y 
Total 
Busines
s 
∆PMSHARE 
Mean 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.06 
Std. Dev. 0.41 0.54 0.53 0.65 0.66 0.39 
Min -0.66 -0.75 -0.76 -0.76 -0.79 -0.74 
Max 1.51 1.82 2.04 2.48 2.55 1.53 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
REINS 
Mean 0.15 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.38 0.33 
Std. Dev. 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.25 
Min 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Max 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.93 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
LEV 
Mean 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 
Std. Dev. 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Min 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Max 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
LIQ 
Mean 0.41 0.74 0.51 0.87 0.80 0.77 
Std. Dev. 0.67 1.23 0.85 1.52 1.29 1.27 
Min 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Max 8.15 8.29 8.15 8.19 8.28 8.06 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
SIZE 
Mean 12.50 11.69 12.05 11.86 11.67 11.64 
Std. Dev. 1.61 1.81 1.65 1.78 1.77 1.80 
Min 8.15 7.36 7.36 7.36 7.36 7.37 
Max 14.49 14.49 14.49 14.49 14.50 14.47 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
SEXP 
Mean 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.31 0.09 
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.08 
Min 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Max 0.43 0.57 0.52 0.73 0.82 0.30 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
PROFIT 
Mean 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Std. Dev. 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Min -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 
Max 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
HHI 
Mean 0.49 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.54 0.62 
Std. Dev. 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.28 
Min 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 
No. of Obs. 1193 1910 1238 1430 1657 2922 
GROUP 
0 145 252 211 170 206 428 
1 1048 1658 1027 1260 1451 2494 
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Table III 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
This table presents the correlation coefficient matrix for the main variables examined in this study. Correlation coefficients are computed using Pearson 
Product Moment Correlation Analysis for each line of insurance business detailed in panels A to F below. All variables are as defined in Table I. Superscripts 
*; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). 
 
Panel A: Motor Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.15***          
zREINSt-1  0.14*** 0.02         
LEVt-1 -0.02 -0.05* 0.31***        
LIQt-1  0.08** 0.06* 0.13*** 0.03       
SIZEt-1 -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.26*** 0.07** -0.38***      
SEXPt-1 -0.04 -0.19*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.03 -0.06**     
PROFITt-1  0.01 -0.12*** -0.03 0.06** 0.10*** 0.09*** -0.11***    
HHIt-1 -0.00  0.02  0.03 -0.24***  0.08*** -0.50***  0.02  0.01   
GROUPt-1  0.02  0.03  0.05*  0.13*** -0.00  0.11*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.06**  
DEVLOSt-1 -0.08*** -0.07**  0.02 -0.22*** -0.10*** -0.20*** -0.10*** -0.09***  0.56***  0.06** 
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Panel B: Property Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.06***          
zREINSt-1  0.15*** -0.07***         
LEVt-1 -0.02 -0.01 0.33***        
LIQt-1  0.03* 0.05** 0.22*** 0.14***       
SIZEt-1 -0.04** -0.04* -0.20*** -0.03 -0.39***      
SEXPt-1  0.02 -0.13*** 0.32*** 0.10*** 0.06*** -0.02     
PROFITt-1  0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.11*** 0.13*** -0.03 -0.09***    
HHIt-1  0.04**  0.02 -0.16*** -0.03*  0.09*** -0.50***  0.11***  0.12***   
GROUPt-1  0.05**  0.05**  0.09***  0.02  0.00  0.11***  0.00 -0.00 -0.23***  
DEVLOSt-1 -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.09*** -0.25*** -0.04* -0.10***  0.25*** -0.14*** 
 
 
Panel C: Legal Liability Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.03          
zREINSt-1  0.16*** 0.01         
LEVt-1  0.04 0.02 0.40***        
LIQt-1  0.10*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.12***       
SIZEt-1 -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.24*** 0.01 -0.35***      
SEXPt-1  0.05* -0.10*** 0.35*** 0.16*** 0.12*** -0.09***     
PROFITt-1  0.01 -0.01 -0.07*** 0.03 0.05** 0 -0.02    
HHIt-1  0.03  0.03 -0.00 -0.18***  0.14*** -0.44***  0.09***  0.06**   
GROUPt-1  0.03 -0.00  0.11***  0.18*** -0.01  0.24***  0.00 -0.11*** -0.41***  
DEVLOSt-1 -0.06** -0.05** -0.05** -0.19*** -0.07*** -0.16*** -0.06** -0.09***  0.09*** -0.09*** 
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Panel D: Personal Accident 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.10***          
zREINSt-1  0.17*** 0         
LEVt-1  0.01 -0.01 0.30***        
LIQt-1  0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.18***       
SIZEt-1 -0.06** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.44***      
SEXPt-1  0.05* -0.07** 0.30*** 0.10*** 0.06** -0.07***     
PROFITt-1 -0.06** -0.09*** -0.11*** 0.09*** 0.33*** -0.16*** 0.04    
HHIt-1  0.01  0.02 -0.24*** -0.02  0.12*** -0.48***  0.09***  0.18***   
GROUPt-1  0.01  0.03  0.12***  0.11***  0.03  0.00  0.10*** -0.01 -0.19***  
DEVLOSt-1 -0.05**  0.00 -0.14***  0.04* -0.06*** -0.31***  0.03  0.06**  0.38***  0.10*** 
 
Panel E: Miscellaneous and Pecuniary Loss Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.03          
zREINSt-1  0.14*** -0.07***         
LEVt-1  0.01 -0.01 0.33***        
LIQt-1  0.04* 0.05** 0.09*** 0.25***       
SIZEt-1 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.42***      
SEXPt-1 -0.02 -0.18*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***     
PROFITt-1 -0.06** -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.17*** 0.27*** -0.18*** 0.01    
HHIt-1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.23***  0.07***  0.09*** -0.55***  0.10***  0.28***   
GROUPt-1  0.03  0.03 -0.00  0.03 -0.02  0.11***  0.07*** -0.00 -0.24***  
DEVLOSt-1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13***  0.10*** -0.02 -0.29*** -0.00  0.05**  0.40*** -0.04* 
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Panel F: Total Business 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.14***          
zREINSt-1  0.08*** -0.09***         
LEVt-1 -0.05** -0.06*** 0.46***        
LIQt-1  0.06*** 0.04** 0.16*** 0.11***       
SIZEt-1 -0.05*** -0.03* -0.22*** -0.03* -0.40***      
SEXPt-1 -0.02 -0.10*** 0.04** 0.07*** 0.11*** -0.25***     
PROFITt-1  0.02 -0.03* -0.06*** 0.10*** 0.13*** -0.041** 0.03    
HHIt-1  0.00  0.00 -0.24*** -0.04**  0.08*** -0.50***  0.08***  0.16***   
GROUPt-1  0.02  0.04**  0.07***  0.08***  0.02  0.08*** -0.00  0.01 -0.18***  
DEVLOSt-1 -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.17***  0.15*** -0.07*** -0.28*** -0.11***  0.02 
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Table IV 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: GMM Results 
This table presents the results of the one-step system GMM regression estimation that tests the effects of the reinsurance ratio on the annual growth in 
market share in each of the five respective product-markets examined in this study. The product-markets examined are: motor, property, legal liability, 
personal accident, and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss insurance. Also reported are the results of tests conducted at the total business level. The validity 
of the specification and instruments is reported using Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and Difference-in-Hansen tests, respectively. AR(1) and 
AR(2) report the results of the Arellano-Bond test in first-differences to test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term εit.. All variables are 
as defined in Table I. Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). Values in parentheses 
adjacent to test statistics AR(1), AR(2), AR(3), Hansen test and Difference-in-Hansen test denote corresponding p-values.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
∆PMSHARE t-1 0.08 0.063 0.09** 0.040 -0.04 0.068 0.05 0.045 -0.02 0.073 0.20*** 0.054
zREINS t-1 0.13** 0.054 0.21*** 0.045 0.15** 0.072 0.14* 0.072 0.15** 0.064 0.19*** 0.048
LEV t-1 0.34 0.328 -0.41* 0.249 -0.42 0.329 -0.09 0.474 -0.09 0.428 -0.59** 0.244
LIQ t-1 -0.01 0.049 -0.02 0.026 0.12** 0.058 0.07* 0.042 0.06 0.043 0.01 0.017
SIZE t-1 -0.17*** 0.051 0.01 0.055 -0.02 0.068 -0.03 0.071 -0.19** 0.079 0.04 0.047
SEXP t-1 -0.2 0.512 -0.21 0.287 -0.81 0.594 -0.1 0.243 -0.2 0.230 -0.42 0.455
PROFIT t-1 0.67* 0.343 0.11 0.248 0.25 0.366 -1.62 1.025 -0.62 0.395 0.12 0.191
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) -6.39 (0.00) -8.29 (0.00) -4.87 (0.00) -6.76 (0.00) -5.07 (0.00) -7.31 (0.00)
AR(2) 1.04 (0.30) 1.92 (0.06) 0.41 (0.68) 0.57 (0.57) 1.53 (0.13) 1.15 (0.25)
AR(3) -0.46 (0.65) -0.57 (0.57) -1.52 (0.13) -0.38 (0.70) -0.59 (0.56) 0.76 (0.45)
Hansen Test 69.36 (0.27) 79.68 (0.40) 75.16 (0.32) 56.33 (0.71) 79.13 (0.41) 68.9 (0.73)
Difference-in-
Hansen Test
6.67 (0.46) 4.44 (0.73) 10.77 (0.15) 7.09 (0.42) 9.97 (0.19) 8.16 (0.32)
Observations (N) 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613
Firms (N) 116 219 173 162 193 233
Instruments (N) 94 108 101 94 108 108
Lag range used 2 - 10 2 - 12 2 - 11 2 - 10 2 - 12 2 - 12
Tot. Business
∆MKTSHARE
Motor Property Legal Liability Pers. Acc. Misc. & Pecuniary
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Table V 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: IV Estimates using Random Effects (G2SLS) Estimator 
This table presents the results of the two-stage random effects regression estimation that tests the effects of the reinsurance ratio on the annual growth 
in market share in each of the five respective product-markets examined in this study. The product-markets examined are: motor, property, legal liability, 
personal accident, and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss insurance. Developed losses are used as the instrument for reinsurance ratio in the first-stage 
(not reported) regressions. The variables used are winsorized at 1% level on both tails. Year-dummies have been used to account for time specific effects. 
All variables are as defined in Table I. Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail).  
 
  
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
∆PMSHARE t-1  0.044 0.033  0.112*** 0.019  0.071 0.061  0.024 0.021  0.034 0.024  0.09*** 0.013
zREINS t-1 -1.187 0.73  0.758*** 0.17  4.339 3.423  2.274*** 0.809  1.071 0.833  0.599*** 0.232
LEV t-1  3.075 1.929 -1.661*** 0.42 -4.531 3.499 -2.787** 1.308 -2.089 1.6 -0.912** 0.391
LIQ t-1  0.05*** 0.013 -0.005*** 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002  0 0.001
SIZE t-1 -0.171** 0.069  0.067*** 0.022  0.133 0.137  0.076 0.075  0.017 0.056 -0.01 0.019
SEXP t-1 -0.555** 0.252  0.447*** 0.106  0.116 0.102  1.242*** 0.229  0.304** 0.135  0.114 0.094
PROFIT t-1 -0.524 0.599  0.671** 0.301  1.618 1.408  0.267 0.867 -0.784 0.735 -0.105 0.21
GROUP t-1  0.214* 0.124  0.07 0.08 -0.448 0.679 -0.377 0.36  0.479* 0.275  0.059 0.062
HHI t-1 -0.194 0.181  0.793*** 0.188  0.168 0.521  1.155* 0.613  1.229* 0.718  0.238 0.151
Constant  2.103 0.592  0.05 0.182  0.826 1.035  0.802 0.581 -0.11 0.552  0.147 0.232
Time dummies
Observations (N)  1193  1910  1238  1430  1657  2922
Firms (N)  113  173  128  143  159  242
Min obs per firm  2  2  2  2  2  2
Avg obs per firm  10.558  11.04  9.672  10  10.421  12.074
Max obs per firm  24  24  24  24  24  24
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆MKTSHARE
Motor Property Legal Liability Pers. Acc. Misc. & Pecuniary Tot. Business
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Table VI 
Non-linearities in reinsurance ratio – market share growth interactions 
This table synthesizes the impact of reinsurance ratio on product market performance (ΔPMSHARE) at varying level of cession rates. The results pertain to 
cession rates at the total business level and the regressions employ our baseline SYS-GMM model described on page 12. For brevity only the estimates 
corresponding to reinsurance ratio – the explanatory variable of interest are reported. Columns 2 and 3 report the range (quartiles) of standardized 
reinsurance ratio used to group the data into respective sets. The values in parentheses report the corresponding non-standardized values of the 
reinsurance ratio. Last column reports coefficients obtained for zREINSt-1 in each of the data-subsets using the GMM-SYS estimator. The quantities in the 
square brackets are the corresponding robust standard errors. The variables used are winsorized at 1% level on both tails. The regressions used year-
dummies to account for time specific effects. All variables are as defined in Table I. Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively (one-tail).  
 
 zREINSt-1 (REINSt-1) 
Coeff. Est. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Very Low zREINS 
-1.38 -0.88 0.19 
(0.00) (0.07) [0.21] 
Low zREINS 
-0.88 -0.25 0.018 
(0.07) (0.25) [0.15] 
High zREINS 
-0.25 0.71 0.23** 
(0.25) (0.52) [0.12] 
Very High zREINS 
0.71 2.63 0.44** 
(0.52) (1.00) [0.25] 
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Figure 1. Premium growth response to reinsurance at varying levels of cession rates. 
This figure displays the estimated response of product-market share growth (ΔPMSHARE) to the lagged normalized reinsurance ratio (zREINS) at four 
different segments of the normalized leverage: [-1.38, -0.88); [-0.88, -0.25); [-0.25,0.71); [0.71,2.63). The slopes are the GMM-estimated coefficients 
using the baseline model as reported in Table VI. The estimated response is conditional on other variables being equal in each segment of observations.  
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